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INTRODUCTION
Iraq has drawn the attention of the world since the first Gulf War
in 1991. Since the 2003 invasion, the international community has
devoted a tremendous amount of effort and resources to Iraq’s
reconstruction. With the primary emphasis on security and rebuilding
infrastructure, the challenges have been formidable and well
documented. However, many have ignored another threat, one that
will become increasingly important in the years ahead. Iraq heavily
depends on the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris, the source of which
comes primarily from outside its own borders. Without a plan to
preserve the long term “strategic” water for Iraq, and prompt action,
any gains in the security or economic sphere in Iraq may be lost.

* The author holds a B.A. and J.D. from Marquette University, and an LL.M.
in Land Use Management and Control from George Washington University with
Highest Honors. He served in the United States Marine Corps as a Judge Advocate
for twenty-seven years, and is currently a Senior Lecturer for the Jackson School
of International Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Senior
Peace Fellow with the Public International Law and Policy Group.
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Unique geography and its access to water have shaped the history
of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. The “Rivers of Eden” find their source
in modern-day Turkey, in the central highlands where rain and snow
are plentiful. The Euphrates flows through Syria and Iraq to the head
of the Persian Gulf, where it joins the Tigris at the Shat-Al-Arab. The
Tigris flows directly from Turkey to Iraq, where it obtains additional
flows from the Zagros Mountains in Iran.
Turkey has been blessed with an environment that can optimally
utilize the waters of the “Two Rivers” of the Euphrates-Tigris. Deep
valleys, cooler temperatures and fertile soil provide good conditions
for catchment, water diversions and agriculture. This is not true for
the neighbors to the south, both Syria and Iraq, where desert
conditions and high evaporation rates prevail. Population growth and
increasing demands from agriculture will seriously affect the supply,
both in quantity and quality, in the years ahead.
As the population in Turkey, Syria and Iraq expands, potential
water deficiencies have become a major concern. The Two Rivers
provide a substantial amount of the fresh water for all three
countries, although Syria’s reliance on the Euphrates is noteworthy.
In a study completed in 2001, the World Bank Environmental
Department predicted the amount of fresh water available per capita
for “water stressed” countries in the region in 2025.1 For Iraq the
1990 figures were 5,285 cubic meters per capita per year (“CMY”)
but the 2025 figures are projected to be 2000 CMY.2 For Syria the
1990 numbers were 439 CMY but they will be reduced to 161 CMY
by 2025. 3
Of the Two Rivers, the Euphrates requires particular attention.
While approximately fifty percent of the water in the Tigris
originates outside Iraq, “more than [ninety percent] of [the

1. RAFIK HIRJI & HANS OLAV IBREKK, ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 8 (World Bank Env’t Dep’t, 2001), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/20
02/05/20/000094946_0205040403116/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (noting that
water stressed areas often have a heightened threat of conflict in times of drought).
2. Rafik Hirji & Hans Olav Ibrekk, Water Resources Data: Water Stressed
and Water Scarce Countries: 2025 Projections, http://www.waterinfo.gr/pages/
data.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Hirij & Ibrekk, 2025 Projections].
3. Id.
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Euphrates] water comes from outside the country.”4 An agreement
reached between Syria and Iraq in April 1990, granted to Iraq fiftyeight percent of the water received by Syria from Turkey.5 In May
2004, the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources stated that Iraq
historically used nearly thirty billion cubic meters (BCM) per year
from the Two Rivers but now uses about a third of that amount.6
Predictions always entail some degree of guesswork, but the
evidence is clear that water demand in the region in the next ten to
twenty years will exceed supply.
When rivers cross international boundaries the most difficult
questions arise: Who is entitled to the water, and how can
downstream countries be protected? Turkey is clearly in the strongest
position in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, geographically, politically
and militarily. But this is a volatile region where international
relations are driven by numerous factors, including oil, politics,
extremism, economics, and outside intervention.

I. WATER WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?
The question of water and conflict is receiving increased attention
from scholars and policy makers. There is a long history of water
playing a role in conflict; Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute has
attempted to provide a comprehensive chronology.7 Gleick regularly
4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, AQUASTAT –
FAO’s Information System on Water and Agriculture: Iraq, http://www.fao.org/nr/
water/aquastat/countries/iraq/index.stm (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
2008 FAO Report] (comparing the relative significance of the two rivers to Iraq’s
access to and control over international watercourses).
5. See Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts during the Occupation of Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 867 (2003) (relating the fact that this is less than one-third the
amount of water Iraq previously received from the Euphrates river).
6. See Dale Gavlak, Iraq Seeks to Ease Water Shortage, BBC NEWS, May 31,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3764905.stm (explaining the view of
Iraq’s Minister for Water Resources, that the water shortage is caused by a lack of
information-sharing and cooperation between countries, as well as poor
infrastructure).
7. See generally PETER H. GLEICK, WATER CONFLICT CHRONOLOGY (Pacific
Institute, 2008), http://worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf (dividing the world’s
water conflicts into six types, including conflicts over control of water resources,
conflicts treating water as a military tool, conflicts treating water as a political tool,
conflicts targeting water sources as tools of terrorism, conflicts that feature water
systems as targets of military actions by the nation or state, and conflicts where
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updates the chronology, and the most recent events are generally
attributed to terrorism, including the 2003 bombing of a water supply
pipeline in Iraq. Although water has rarely been the primary factor in
war, there is an emerging consensus that the likelihood of conflict
over water will increase in the next fifteen years “as countries press
against the limits of available water.”8 In a 2001 speech, the
Chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council warned:
By 2015 nearly half the world’s population—more than 3
billion people—will live in countries that are “waterstressed”—having less than 1,700 cubic meters of water per
capita per year—mostly in Africa, the Middle East, South
Asia, and northern China . . . . Water shortages occurring in
combination with other sources of tension—such as in the
Middle East—will be the most worrisome.9
Professor Tony Allen of the University of London, School of
Oriental and African Studies notes that “the Middle East as a region
ran out of water in the 1970’s.”10 Professor Allen has theorized that
the shortage has been made up by importing food, and the water is
now “virtual” and contained or imbedded in the imported
commodities.11 As an example, one kilogram of wheat requires 1000

water systems play a significant role in development disputes).
8. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A DIALOGUE
ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS 27 (2000), available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf
(noting
that
historically water shortages have a tendency to increase cooperation, but as water
becomes more scarce and populations increase, the likelihood of conflict over
water also increases).
9. John C. Gannon, Chairman, Nat’l Intelligence Council, Remarks at a
Conference Sponsored by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: The Role of Intelligence
Services in a Globalized World (May 21, 2001), available at http://www.dni.gov/
nic/speeches_globalizedworld.html (emphasizing the vulnerability of the Middle
East to more serious water conflicts due to the already-high political tensions in
that region).
10. J. ANTHONY ALLAN, THE MIDDLE E AST WATER QUESTION:
HYDROPOLITICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2002) [hereinafter ALLAN, THE
MIDDLE E AST].
11. J. Anthony Allan, Water Stress and Global Mitigation: Water, Food, and
Trade, ARID LANDS NEWSL., Spring/Summer 1999 (Office of Arid Land Studies,
Univ. of Ariz., Tucson, Ariz.), available at http://cals.arizona.edu/OALS/ALN/
aln45/allan.html (offering one theory on how the Middle Eastern economic
systems compensate for water scarcity in the region).
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liters of water to produce.12 A nation that is water-scarce can make
up for the shortage by importing food. But this is not a solution for
countries that do not have the economic resources, and in matters of
food security a nation will prefer not to rely on the good will of
neighboring states to make the food available.
There have been dire predictions of water wars for years. In 1988,
author R.Z. Chesnoff posited the following hypothetical scenario:
“Nov. 12, 1993. War erupted throughout the Middle East today in a
desperate struggle for dwindling water supplies. Iraqi forces,
attempting to smash a Syrian blockade, launched massive attacks on
the Euphrates River valley. Syria answered with missile attacks on
Baghdad.”13 Long after his prediction, the scenario depicted by Mr.
Chesnoff has not yet occurred. The “water pessimists” have been
consistently proven wrong, but their alarm is not misplaced. 14
Although there may not be a clear and present danger of a water war
between Turkey, Syria, or Iraq, the next twenty years are likely to
see more political instability and declining public health in the
region. A water crisis is likely, but may not occur as a classic
shooting war. Some analysts believe the problem is not water stress
per se (as with conditions within individual countries) but rather the
unilateral attempts to develop an international river without an
agreement between neighbors.15 Further, there seems to be new
consensus that water will become an increasingly volatile strategic
issue in the next ten to twenty years.16 Combined with a global food
12. World Water Council, Virtual Water, http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/
index.php?id=866 (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (illustrating how a country can
reduce domestic water use by importing foods that require a large amount of water
to grow).
13. Richard Z. Chesnoff, When Water Feeds Flames, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 21, 1988, at 47 (imagining violence between Iraq and Syria as they
fight for control over the water of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers).
14. ALLAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 10, at 3 (arguing that into the future,
the countries in the region of the Middle East and North Africa will encounter the
greatest difficulty in ensuring freshwater supply sufficiently satisfies the needs of
their growing populations).
15. Sandra L. Postel & Aaron T. Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict, FOREIGN POL’Y,
Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 60, 63 (stating that “[W]ater disputes between countries, though
typically not leading to war directly, have fueled decades of regional tensions,
thwarted economic development, and risked provoking larger conflicts before
eventually giving way to cooperation.”).
16. Jason J. Morrissette & Douglas A. Borer, Where Oil and Water Do Mix:
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crisis that has already taken its toll in 2008, there is real cause for
alarm.17
Since 2003 and the invasion of Iraq, the strategic landscape in the
region of the Tigris-Euphrates has changed dramatically and is still
unstable. Without increased international attention, the situation will
undermine other factors that might otherwise favor regional
stability.18 This means that even if the optimists are right, and Iraq
eventually emerges as a stable and peaceful country, all gains can be
lost if a water crisis envelops the area. Even though the situation in
Iraq remains unsettled, the long-term consequences of a water crisis
in the next ten to twenty years cannot be ignored.

II. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
Prior to World War I, international law with respect to rivers
primarily served to resolve disputes concerning freedom of
navigation.19 Since that time, increasing polulation and dwindling
water supplies have led policy-makers to attempts to provide general
guidelines applicable to the world’s watersheds. The concept of a
“drainage basin,” for example, was accepted by the International
Law Association in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, it also provided
guidelines for the reasonable and equitable sharing of a common

Environmental Scarcity and Future Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa,
PARAMETERS, Winter 2004-2005, at 86, 87 (noting that trends towards elites
holding ownership of scarce natural resources and the associated violent conflicts
are likely to continue and worsen without peace agreements and an increased
reliance on virtual water, the water conserved by importing food).
17. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, The New Economics of Hunger, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 2008, at A1 (highlighting the outbreaks of violence in numerous countries
as a direct result of the global food crisis and rising food prices).
18. HENRI J. BARKEY, TURKEY AND IRAQ: THE PERILS (AND PROSPECTS) OF
PROXIMITY 19 (U.S. Inst. for Peace, 2005) available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/sr141.pdf (noting the many setbacks Iraq has suffered since the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and highlighting the impediment to dialogue
between Turkey and Iraq that the invasion has caused).
19. FREDERICK M. LORENZ & EDWARD J. ERICKSON, THE EUPHRATES
TRIANGLE 30 (1999) (outlining the history of international water law); see also
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B.
BOURNE 30-31 (Patricia Wouters ed., Kluwer Law Int’l Ltd. 1997) (explaining that
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international water law served to
ensure freedom of navigation).
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waterway.20 Under Article IV of the Helsinki Rules, “[e]ach basin
State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage
basin.”21
Developing broad concepts that apply to all watersheds has been
challenging from the start. Even the term “international drainage
basin” has proven to be controversial in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin,
and Turkey has consistently maintained that the two rivers form a
single basin.22 This argument can lead to both practical and political
benefits for Turkey. If Iraq should claim a water shortage in the flow
of the Euphrates, Turkey can argue any defecit be made up from the
excess flow of the Tigris inside Iraq. And Turkey can point to the
fact that Iraq has already created a canal to do just that, strengthening
its argument on the “one basin” theory.23
Applying general legal guidelines to particular rivers is a daunting
task. Article V of the Helsinki Rules lists eleven factors to consider
in defining reasonable and equitable use of water.24 “There is no
hierarchy provided for these components; they are instead to be
considered as a whole. One important shift in legal thinking in the
Helsinki Rules is the right to beneficial use of water, rather than to
water per se. But this change has not made the rules any easier to
20. International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of
International Rivers, 52 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 484 (1966) [hereinafter
Helsinki Rules] (outlining the duties and obligations of States using and sharing
international drainage basins, including both surface and underground waters).
21. Id. art. 4 (stating, with further explanation in art. 5, that States determine
the definition of a reasonable and equitable share in the light of all relevant
factors).
22. AYSEGUL KIBAROGLU, BUILDING A REGIME FOR THE WATERS OF THE
EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN 241 (Kluwer Law International, Ltd. 2002)
23. Id. at 241-42 (describing the Thartar Canal in Iraq and surplus water in the
Tigris River).
24. Helsinki Rules, arts. 4, 5, supra note 20 (listing the factors that States must
consider, including but not limited to: the geography of the basin, the hydrology of
the basin, the climate affecting the basin, the past utilization of waters of the basin,
the economic and social needs of each basin State, the population dependent on the
waters of the basin in each basin State, the comparative costs of alternative means
of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin State, the availability of
other resources, the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of
the basin, the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States
as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses, and the degree to which of a basin
State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State).
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apply, and the Helsinki Rules have rarely been used to help define
water use. The Mekong Committee used the Helsinki Rules
definition of ‘reasonable and equitable use’ in formulation of their
Declaration of Principles in 1975, although no specific allocations
were determined.”25 Although they were rarely applied, in the
absence of any other framework for resolving international water
disputes most States considered them to be valid as customary
international law.26
During the United Nations’ review of the Helisinki Rules, some
states (notably Brazil, Belgium, China, and France) viewed the
drainage basin approach as contravening national soveriegnty, and
objected to its prominence.27 “Others, notably Finland and the
Netherlands, argued that a watershed was the most rational and
scientific unit to be managed. Still others argued that, given the
complexity and uniqueness of each watershed, general codification
should not even be attempted.”28 States were of course determined to
promote their own national interest and each brought a unique
history and experience in disputes over water. Some States were
heavily reliant on water from outside their own borders, and others,
such as China, Canada and Turkey, were more concerned with
sovereignty over water inside the country. On December 8, 1970, the
U.N. General Assembly directed its own legal advisory body, the
International Law Commission to prepare a draft Codification of the
Law on Water Courses for Purposes other than Navigation.29
25. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30. See also Aaron T. Wolf,
Criteria for Equitable allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict, NAT.
RESOURCES F., Feb. 1999, at 3-4 (noting that although States have only used the
guidelines once, several States have questioned the potentially under inclusive
process used in drafting the Helsinki Rules).
26. See Salman A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 630 (2007) (discussing the history and
development of the Helsinki Rules).
27. Other Legal Questions: Progressive Development and Codification of the
Rules of International Law Relating to International Watercourses, 1970 U.N.Y.B.
817, 819, U.N. Sales No. E.72.I.1 [hereinafter Other Legal Questions] (noting the
vote of Brazil against the resolution and reporting the objections of China and
other countries to various parts of the resolution).
28. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30; see also Other Legal Questions,
supra note 27 at 817.
29. Id. at 818.
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Despite an additional call for codification at the U.N. Water
Conference at Mar de Plata in 1977, the International Law
Commission took twenty-one years to complete its Draft Articles.
Political and hydrological problems slowed the process. As an
example, “in response to a 1974 questionnaire submitted to member
states, about half the respondents supported the concept of a drainage
basin (e.g. Argentina, Finland and the Netherlands), while half were
strongly negative (e.g. Austria, Brazil, and Spain) or ambivalent.”30
Some viewed the recognition of a “Watercourse system” as a basin
to threaten national sovereignty.31 Again, each State was motivated to
protect its own special concerns and unique geographical setting.
Downstream and upstream States are inherently skeptical of the
actions of the other.
More than two decades after receiving its direction from the
General Assembly, the International Law Commission adopted
thirty-two draft principles in 1994. Three years later, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the draft principles as “The Convention
on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
[“Framework Convention”].32 The Convention provided that thirtyfive States had to ratify before it would become effective.
Similarly to the Helsinki Rules, the Framework Convention
generally requires communication and cooperation among riparian
states along an international watercourse.33 Further, the Convention
strives to promote the exchange of data and information and
notification of possible adverse effects among states sharing a
watercourse. Further, states should aim to protect eco-systems, and
the Convention provides for emergency situations. “Allocations are
dealt with through equally vague language. ‘Equitable and
reasonable use’ within each watercourse state, ‘with a view to
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits
30. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30.
31. See id.
32. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (July 8, 1997)
[hereinafter Convention] (including sections on cooperation and the sharing of
information among parties to the treaty).
33. See, e.g., Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi Sinjela, Current Development:
The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 97 (1998) (providing an overview of the Convention and its negotiation).
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therefrom,’ (Article 5) is balanced with an obligation not to cause
‘significant harm’ (Article 7).”34 The latter provision is always of
greatest concern to the upstream riparian, and it is easy to
contemplate a situation where an upstream country would be ordered
by an international court to release more water if Article 7 had been
violated.
One of the major difficulties in managing transboundary water is
that much of it is moving underground and is therefore much more
difficult to measure and regulate. The term “watercourse” in the
Framework Convention can include both surface and groundwater,
and is based largely on the terms of the Helsinki Rules, but it
includes only groundwater that is connected to the surface water.35 It
does not incorporate a broader definition of groundwater contained
in what is now known as the Seoul Rules, which includes
transboundary aquifers that are not connected to surface waters of an
international drainage basin.36
Existing law for transboundary water has proven easy to argue but
very difficult to apply. For example, in many areas of the world with
frequently changing political boundaries, riparian positions and legal
rights may shift just as quickly. The Framework Convention sets up
“a balancing test more appropriate for the courtroom than the
politically-charged atmosphere of international water disputes. A
balancing test requires some third party, such as an arbitrator,
watermaster, or court, to resolve the issues. In water basins without
such a regime, balancing tests are not particularly useful.”37
The uncertainty in international water law is compounded by the
fact that cases are generally heard by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) only with the consent of the parties involved, and no
practical enforcement mechanism is available.38 These considerations
34. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30; Convention, supra note 32, at
4-5 (showing both the obligation to make reasonable use of the waters and to avoid
causing significant harm to other watercourse States).
35. See Convention, supra note 32.
36. See Salman, supra note 26, at 630 (describing the efforts of the
International Law Commission in Seoul in 1986 to clarify certain provisions of the
Helsinki Rules).
37. LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 19, at 30-31.
38. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1042 , T.S. 993
(1945).
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have limited the ICJ to just a single case concerning the law of
transboundary rivers.39 In the one case heard by the ICJ the results
were mixed, and although the case may have clarified some of the
general principles of equitable utilization it failed to resolve the
dispute between the riparian countries.40 This reveals the
fundamental problem in transboundary water law, complex standards
to be decided by a judge using a “balancing of interests” are of
limited value on the international stage.
International law plays only a minor role in the Euphrates-Tigris
Basin, as the Framework Convention is not yet in force, and Turkey
refuses to become a party.41 All the parties have legal arguments, but
they have more political value than practical effect. Turkey has
consistently opposed efforts to “internationalize” the matter, relying
on the same legal doctrines that the U.S. once used in disputes with
Mexico concerning the Colorado River.42 At the time of this writing
only sixteen states had ratified the Framework Convention, and that
number includes both Syria and Iraq.43
In regions such as North America, with plentiful water resources
and good international relations, the record of cooperation is
excellent. But Middle Eastern river basins face pressures from
39. Aaron T. Wolf, Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation, 32 ANN. REV.
ENV’T & RESOURCES 3.1, 3.18-3.19 (2007) (noting that, in its fifty-five-year
history, the International Court of Justice has only heard one case pertaining to
international waters).
40. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 7).
41. See Murat Metin Hakki, Borders and Boundaries in International Law:
Cross-Border Water Conflicts in Mesopotamia: An Analysis According to
International Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 245, 255 (2005)
(noting Turkey’s attempt to analogize oil and water rights and suggesting Turkish
officials believe the rivers’ waters are the sole property of Turkey); Scott L.
Cunningham, Comment, Do Brothers Divide Shares Forever? Obstacles to the
Effective Use of International Law in Euphrates River Basin Water Issues, 21 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 131, 158 (2000) (noting Iraq’s current contention that
Turkey has violated numerous existing international treaties with respect to water
law).
42. See Hekki, supra note 41 (discussing Turkey’s assertion of the “Harmon
Doctrine” which the U.S. used in its dealings with Mexico concerning the water of
the Colorado River).
43. See International Water Law Project, Status of the Watercourse Convention
(Jan. 8, 2008) available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/intldocs/water
course_status.html (listing signers of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable
Uses of International Watercourses).
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growing populations, limited resources and political turmoil.
Unfortunately, international law has often reinforced separate and
competitive theories among states that share the same watercourse.
The conflicting doctrines that formed the basis of international water
law give every State a point to argue, but little help in achieving
common ground.
It is a fair question to ask, why have so few States supported the
Framework Convention some eleven years after its opening for
signature? The Lead Counsel for the International Water Resources
Association believes that it is due in part to inaccurate perceptions
and interpretations of the Convention.44 In a recent article he notes
that both upstream riparians (e.g Turkey and China) and downstream
riparians (e.g. Egypt and France) believe that the convention favors
the other party. He also points out another area of confusion, it is
little understood that upstream riparians can be harmed caused by the
prior use and the claiming of rights by downstream riparians.45
Other reasons why the Framework Convention has not been
adopted is a “total failure to comprehend the basic rules of
contemporary international water law that have long rejected the
principle of absolute territorial sovereignty.”46 He argues that it is
now generally agreed that the “management of international
watercourses should be determined less by the traditional notion of
‘restricted sovereignty’ than by a positive spirit of cooperation and
effective interdependence.”47
Although he is not a lawyer, Dr. Tony Allan provides insight on
the question of international law and its impact on water rights in the
Mddle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.48 He notes that the
legal principles are largely developed by “water outsiders”49 and the
indroduction of water policy reform (and water law) has been slow.
44. Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten
Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult? 24 WATER INT’L 1, 9
(2007).
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. See generally ALLAN, supra note 10, at 263-308 (discussing International
Water Law in the Middle East and North Africa).
49. See generally id. at 3-40 (providing an overview of the debates between
water pessimists and optimists, insiders and outsiders).
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Because water is highly mobile, and monitoring is difficult, any rules
are difficult to enforce. Moreover, “alien legal principles, evolved in
alien outsider institutions . . . have little appeal to MENA politicians,
professionals and communities when they will disrupt exixting
practice and are not founded on the cultural and religious
conventions of the region.”50
Although legal principles are of potential significance in the
Euphrates-Tigris basin, they have had little impact in the region. The
current rules are complex and misunderstood, and face tremendous
obstacles to implementation. Only with the right diplomatic and
economic incentives can we look to international law to provide a
roadmap for cooperation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

III. WATER NEEDS FOR IRAQ
The population of Iraq is currently about twenty-eight million
people, but recent large scale displacement within Iraq, and the
exodus of refugees, makes accurate data difficult to obtain.51
Approximately twenty-five percent of the population historically
depended on irrigated agriculture for their livelihood.52 Agricultural
products traditionally accounted for a significant proportion of Iraq’s
exports, but this has been reduced by the recent turmoil. Agriculture
still uses about ninety percent of Iraq’s average annual water supply,
and is therefore critical to fresh water development and
management.53 Salination of a large part of the irrigated land results
in reduced crop yields and high salinity of the rivers, creating
50. Id. at 288.
51. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Iraq, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008)
(listing the Iraq population in July 2008 as 28.2 million people, while also
reporting that about two million people have fled the ongoing conflict in Iraq).
52. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Johanns Announces $7.8 Million in
Extension Funds to Revitalize Iraq’s Agriculture (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1RD?printable=true&content
idonly=true&contentid=2006/09/0378.xml (announcing U.S.-led programs to
connect U.S. and Iraqi land-grant institutions to support Iraq’s agricultural sector,
which is the country’s second largest industry and employs one-fourth of the
workforce).
53. 2008 FAO Report, supra note 4 (reporting that in 1990, Iraq used ninetytwo percent of water withdrawal for agricultural purposes, while more recent
estimates list this figure at eighty-five percent).
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problems in the municipal water supply, as well as ecological
problems, which threaten the restoration potential of marshlands that
Saddam Hussein had drained while he was in power.54
Iraq has over 500 major pumping stations meant to distribute
water to farms and cities that gravity canals cannot reach. These
pumping stations are currently in disrepair due to years of neglect by
the previous regime, and the looting and damage that occurred
immediately following the U.S. led invasion. In the summer of 2003
the pumping stations were operating at about forty percent
efficiency.55 By the summer of 2004 there was no improvement; the
money allocated for repair had not been spent due to contract
inefficiencies and security concerns.56 In September 2004 it was
announced that the original amount allocated for improvements to
water and sewage in Iraq of $4.15 billion, would be cut to $2.21
billion. This was part of the shift in American priorities in Iraq, and
recognition of the seriousness of the security situation.57
The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources was reorganized and
staffed in 2003 and 2004 with U.S. assistance. It developed
ambitious plans for a transboundary water commission in the hopes
of coordination with Iraq’s upstream neighbors.58 By 2007 there was
54. NURIT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 159
(1994) (naming soil salinity as the greatest obstacle to Iraqi agriculture, and noting
that as early as 1949, an estimated sixty percent of the land irrigated by flow water
was seriously affected by salt); see also Press Release, IRIN Humanitarian News
and Analysis, Iraq: New Dams Threaten Agriculture and Marshland (Nov. 29,
2006), available at http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=61975
(reporting that due to Saddam Hussein’s marshland flooding policies, an area that
in 1970 comprised 3600 square miles of marshlands shrank by ninety percent to
300 square miles in 2002).
55. Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Senior Advisor, Iraq Ministry of Irrigation, Fact Sheet,
(July 4, 2003) (on file with author).
56. Interview with Walled Abdel-Hameed, Planning Coordinator, Iraq Ministry
of Water Resources, in Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 1, 2004).
57. James Glanz, Iraqis Warn that U.S. Plan to Divert Billions to Security
Could Cut Off Crucial Services, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A12 (explaining
that the dramatic reduction in resources allocated for water and sewage
improvements resulted from shifting priorities and factors stemming from the
sociopolitical conflict).
58. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer and
Iraq’s Minister of Water Resources Announce Major Irrigation Project as Ministry
Takes Final Steps Toward Sovereignty (May 10, 2004), available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org [hereinafter CPA Press Release] (explaining how the
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little progress in rebuilding Iraq’s water infrastructure, by some
estimates it will take $15 billion to fully restore Iraq’s water
system.59 Without a guarantee of a long-term water supply, any
progress in this sector could be for naught.
The Iraqi leadership recognized the threat of reduced water supply
in their Iraqi National Security Strategy for 2007-2010.
The problem of decreasing water levels in the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers is a dangerous phenomenon that directly
threatens environmental and nutritional security. It affects the
climate and wetlands, increases desertification, and even
decreases the availability of potable water in the middle and
southern regions. This problem stems essentially from the
fact that there are large dams in Turkey and Syria for storing
the water of the two rivers that do not take into consideration
the rights of Iraq to water resources and the longer stretch of
these rivers on its territory. Therefore, leaving this problem as
it is due to the failure of joint committees formed to resolve it
leaves Iraq subject to a catastrophe that threatens its current
and future national security.60
Recognizing the threat as a security issue may be the first step in
dealing with the problem. However, having the diplomatic and
economic resources to deal with Turkey and Syria on these issues
remains a formidable obstacle for Iraq.

IV. THE KURDISH QUESTION
The question of Kurdish autonomy and possible independence
from Iraq has been the subject of much debate, with the sharing of oil
resources being a central factor in that discussion.61 But the sharing
advances made by the Ministry after its administrative reorganization have helped
the Ministry gain sovereignty).
59. Iraq Needs $15bn to Fix Water Supply, ALJAZEERA NEWS, June 29, 2005
(reporting that the Water Resources Minister’s estimation of the cost to build and
repair dams, irrigation canals, sewage systems and purification stations).
60. Republic of Iraq Nat’l Sec. Council, IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
16 (July 2007), available at http://www.iraqslogger.com/downloads/NSS_
English.pdf (listing Iraq’s ecological interdependence as a threat to the country’s
stability and laying out strategies to overcome the recognized security threats).
61. See Jason Campbell, Michael O’Hanlon & Amy Unikewicz, Op-Ed., The
State of Iraq: An Update, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at WK13 (setting hypothetical
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of water resources within Iraq is rarely reported, despite the fact that
the Kurdish areas in the north control a major part of the flow of the
Tigris River, as well as major dams. Expanding irrigation and
agriculture in northern Iraq, or the building of new dams, will further
complicate the already tenuous water situation in the south.
The Kurds in northern Iraq have long recognized the importance
of controlling their own water resources. It is no accident that an
influential Kurd, Latif Rashid, was appointed to the newly formed
Ministry of Water Resources in Baghdad soon after the U.S. led
invasion in 2003.62 The Kurds seem better organized than their Iraqi
brethren in the south; comparatively good security in the north has
no doubt been a factor. And the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) has an independent water resources management system,
with its own strategic planning apparatus.63 The Kurds are not
reluctant to criticize Turkish projects, such as the Ilisu Dam, that are
likely to impact their own water resources.64
The Kurds are moving ahead in developing Northern Iraq without
waiting for stability in the central government in Baghdad.65 On
March 16, 2008 the KRG Minister of Water Resources received a
commercial delegation from the United States that included Jay M.
Garner, a retired U.S. General and former head of the Office of
political goals for Iraq which include holding a referendum on the disputed
northern oil city of Kirkuk); see also Gary Kent, Iraq’s Kurds Deserve Better
Neighbors, NEW STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.newstatesman.com/
media/2008/02/iraq-turkey-kurds-pkk-syria (explaining that the debate over Kirkuk
is mainly over oil reserves and the fear that Kurd control of a portion of the oil
reserves could provide a basis for Kurds to favor independence over the current
stance favoring autonomy).
62. Iraq’s
Post-War
Cabinet,
BBC
NEWS,
Sept.
1,
2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3199561.stm (listing all new cabinet
members to the Ministry of Water Resources by ethnic and religious grouping).
63. See NABAZ TAHIR, MINISTRY OF WATER RES., STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
(2007), available at http://www.mowr-krg.org/PDF/Strategic%20Outlook.PDF
(outlining the plan for the Ministry of Water Resources to effectively attend to the
water needs of the Kurdish Region).
64. See Press Release, Kurdish Human Rights Project, Reemergence of
Discredited Ilisu Dam Project: Turkish Dams Violate EU Standards and Human
Rights (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.khrp.org/news/pr2005/06-0405.htm (arguing that besides displacing up to 78,000 mostly Kurdish people, that
the dam project will also submerge important archeological sites).
65. See Ministry of Water Resources, Minister of Water Resources Meet USA
Delegation, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.mowr-krg.org/.
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Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.66 The purpose of the
meeting was to find a mechanism to involve the private sector in
reconstruction of the Federal Region of Kurdistan. The outlook for
Iraq, in terms of a federal system or autonomy for the north, remains
unresolved at the time of this writing. But the issue of water
resources between the north and the south will have to be part of the
final resolution.

V. THE TURKISH DAMS
In the 1930s, the father of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk,
proposed the construction of a series of dams with the idea of
harnessing the mighty Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The Southeast
Anatolia Project (“GAP” from Turkish) is the culmination of that
dream and a source of great national pride.67 The GAP was funded
without the benefit of international financial organizations or the
World Bank. International concern about the impact on downstream
neighbors prevented loans and grants for the Turkish dams.
The GAP is a large-scale and multi-sector regional development
project with major implications for the region. It is one of the major
river basin development projects in the world and the largest and
most comprehensive project ever carried out in Turkey. The project
is located in Southeastern Turkey and includes eight provinces
covering a vast area that includes Turkey’s most desolate and poorest
regions.68 The GAP is intended to bring industrialization and growth
to the poorest regions of the country, send electricity to population
centers and add to the agricultural export base of Turkey. It is also
designed to provide hope for the large Kurdish minority in the
region.
The GAP project area includes nearly half of the total watershed
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers within Turkey, and when fully
66. Id.
67. See generally İ.H. Olcay Ünver & Rajiv K. Gupta, A New Perspective on
Water Development and Poverty Reduction in Southeastern Anatolia, Turkey, in
WATER DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION 231, 232 (İ.H. Olcay Ünver et
al. eds., 2003) (explaining that the Southeast Anatolia Project was developed to
spur socio-economic development in the “fertile crescent” by abolishing interregional differences through infrastructure investment).
68. See id. at 233, 237 (providing a map of the GAP region and describing the
high infant mortality rate and low average household income).
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developed it will provide irrigation for 1.7 million hectares (nearly
four million acres) of land, or twenty percent of the irrigable land in
Turkey.69 The GAP includes thirteen major irrigation and
hydropower schemes that involve the construction of twenty-two
dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants on the two rivers.70
The GAP will eventually double Turkey’s 1984 hydroelectric
capacity, and is expected to generate twenty-seven billion KWH per
year; a substantial portion of Turkey’s electric power needs.71
Today hydroelectric production from GAP is estimated to be at
about ninety-six percent of capacity, but the irrigation infrastructure
is estimated to be only twenty percent complete, far behind the
objectives described in the original Master Plan.72 The regional
economic growth has not matched the predicted development
indicated in the plan, placing limits on construction of new canals.
Pessimistic local Turkish newspaper reports have estimated the GAP
irrigation system could take another thirty years to complete.73 But
hydropower presents a high priority for Turkey; the immediate
economic benefit of power generation was a strong motivation to
keep those aspects of the project on track.

69. SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT REG’L DEV. ADMIN., LATEST
SITUATION ON SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT ACTIVITIES OF THE GAP
ADMINISTRATION 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Genel/
sdurum.pdf [hereinafter REG’L DEV. ADMIN.] (reporting that although the GAP
region is only ten percent of the geographical area of Turkey, it possesses twenty
percent of the irrigatable land).
70. Ünver & Gupta, supra note 67, at 240 (explaining the construction needed
to succeed in developing and sustaining the region).
71. Id. at 241; see also REG’L DEV. ADMIN., supra note 69, at 2.
72. JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY,THE STUDY ON THE REG’L
DEV. PLAN FOR THE EASTERN BLACK SEA REGION IN THE REPUBLIC OF T URKEY 410 (2000) (illustrating the official GAP Plan in 1989 as published by the GAP
Regional Development Administration).
73. The author lived in Ankara during 2003 and again in 2007and reviewed
local media. The consensus of published reports seemed to be that the project
would take at least twenty more years to complete. See also SEMINAR FOR
DOCTORAL STUDENTS AT THE ETH ZURICH, CASE STUDY: SOUTHEASTERN
ANATOLIA PROJECT IN TURKEY – GAP 6 (2007), available at
http://www.eawag.ch/research_e/
apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf
[hereinafter
SEMINAR] (noting that the deadline for the GAP project has been moved to 2047
due to financial constraints).
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Today Turkey maintains that it uses only 25.9 billion cubic meters
(BCM) of its capacity of 110 BCM of fresh water.74 It claims that the
remaining 84.1 BCM “is not surplus,” but “cannot yet be allocated to
its needs.”75 This part of Turkey’s position can be verified in the
sense that Turkey has been unable to complete its grand plans for
irrigation infrastructure, and the water behind the dams in Turkey
remains largely unused for agriculture. Slow progress of the GAP
irrigation project has indirectly benefited the downstream countries
by delaying the inevitable impact on water resources. Currently, less
than twenty percent of the total irrigation diversions have occurred
and the dams producing hydropower, once filled, will not reduce the
flow of the rivers.76 But the long term impact of increased irrigation
in Turkey is a different matter.
During the author’s time in Ankara in the summer of 2007, water
was a major topic of concern, but only because of the drought and
water supply cuts that were affecting everyone in the city.77 A visit to
the GAP Administration offices in August revealed that the agency
was focusing more on the social and economic aspects of the project
than the overall irrigation and consumptive water use.78 The GAP
Administration has responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the
project, but lacks the authority to control water infrastructure. In
74. THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF REG. AND
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS, WATER ISSUES BETWEEN TURKEY, SYRIA, AND IRAQ 2
(1996), available at http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume1/June-August
1996/WATERISSUESBETWEENTURKEYSYRIAANDIRAQ.pdf
[hereinafter
WATER ISSUES STUDY] (explaining that the amount of fresh water available to
Turkey per capita is one-fifth of the amount available in water-rich countries).
75. Id.
76. See REG’L DEV. ADMIN., supra note 69, at 4 (noting that the project was
13.7 percent complete at the end of 2005).
77. See Water Supply Cuts Create Controversy in Turkey Suffering from
Drought, THE NEW ANATOLIAN, Aug. 4, 2007, available at http://www.thenew
anatolian.com/tna-28079.html (reporting water levels in the Konya Basin,
containing forty percent of Turkey’s groundwater resources, down eighteen meters
in the past twenty years, and three meters in the past year).
78. In previous visits to the GAP project headquarters between 1997 and 2003
the author was provided a bag full of pamphlets and materials, in English, with the
positive aspects of the GAP project emphasized. This may have been due in part to
the proactive work of the previous director, Dr. Olcay Ünver, who left the project
in 2003 for a teaching position at Kent State University in the United States. He
has since moved on to lead the UNESCO World Water Assessment Program in
Paris.
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Turkey the real authority in terms of dams and irrigation lies with the
State Hydraulic Works, which is responsible for “the utilization of all
water resources in Turkey.”79
In the summer of 2007 the AK (Justice and Development) Party
won reelection in Turkey, and continued to push ahead with
modernization policies and movement towards membership in the
European Union.80 This could have important implications for the
Euphrates-Tigris Basin, because the E.U. will have a moderating
impact on Turkish policy, and ultimately require Turkish consistency
with E.U. environmental standards.81 If the E.U. ultimately rejects
Turkey, or Turkey decides to move away from the E.U., there may
be less incentive for Turkey to cooperate on water issues with its
neighbors to the south.
The Turkish position on transboundary waters has been consistent
and open, beginning with the argument that “Turkey is not a country
with excess water capacity.”82 It states, “[a]lthough Turkey has at
present more water resources than some of its neighbors, it can be
regarded as a country which will find itself in a position not to meet
its own needs in the near future.”83 As mentioned earlier, Turkey has
consistently maintained that the Euphrates and Tigris constitute “one
79. TURKISH GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE HYDRAULIC WORKS, MISSION
DUTIES, http://www.dsi.gov.tr/english/about/goreve.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2008) (stating a mission to develop water resources for a number of functions,
including irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, city water supply, recreation,
and research).
80. Turkish PM Vows to Pursue Reform, BBC NEWS, July 23, 2007, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6911223.stm (announcing the re-election of
the Islamist-rooted AK-party Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and
reflecting that his efforts may meet resistance from a secular Turkey).
81. See generally EUROPA, OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ACTIVITIES:
ENVIRONMENT, http://europa.eu/pol/env/print_overview_en.htm (last visited Aug.
26, 2008) (emphasizing the importance of protecting the environment and using
alternative sources of energy); TURK. REPUBLIC PRIME MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF STATE PLANNING ORG., MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS REPORT: TURKEY 52 (2005), http://www.undp.org.tr/publications
Documents/6161-Turkey_MDG_Report.pdf (explaining the major legal changes
Turkey is making to conform its environmental policies to those of the United
Nations).
82. See WATER ISSUES STUDY, supra note 74, at 1.
83. See id. (explaining that a large portion of the unutilized fresh water in
Turkey is not surplus but rather water that has not yet been harnessed in a usable
form).
AND
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basin,” with the implication that any downstream shortage (in Iraq,
for example) can be made up by re-allocating water between the Two
Rivers.84 In Iraq the situation for the Tigris is less severe than for the
Euphrates, as Iraq draws a portion of its water from Iran through the
Tigris, but the Euphrates flow is virtually all from Turkey.
Today in Turkey the GAP project is moving ahead, with virtually
all of the hydropower units completed. Reports from mid-level water
officials in Ankara in 2007 indicated that the water is now available
behind the dams for expanded irrigation in the GAP Region, but that
the infrastructure is still only twenty percent complete due to
financing difficulties.85 In an attempt to move the process forward,
the Prime Minister made a major speech just before the election in
2007 stating the need for a program of private investment in the GAP
Region.86 In 2008 world financial difficulties began to have an
impact on emerging markets like Turkey, presenting another risk to
infrastructure development.87 Turkish agriculture has still not
received the amount of water promised more than ten years ago, and
while this may delay the ultimate impact in Syria and Iraq, it
certainly will not prevent an eventual water crisis.

84. See BÜLENT TOPKAYA, WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
FORTHCOMING PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE REGION (1998), http://www.akdeniz.edu.tr/muhfak/publications/gap.html
#Turkey (presenting Turkey’s proposal for equitable distribution of the river
waters between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq by moving some of the Tigris’ water to the
Euphrates in a attempt to between the country’s solutions).
85. Interviews with Officials at the GAP Administration and the State
Hydraulic Works (DSI) (Aug. 2007); see also SEMINAR, supra note 73, at 6
(estimating only 450 million US dollars were invested in 1999 when there need to
be closer to 900 million US dollars invested and that the lack of funding has
caused at least a 15 year delay in construction).
86. See Turkish PM Unveils Investment Plan for South East, NTVMSNBC,
May 27, 2008, available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/447959.asp
(proposing funding to come from Turkey’s unemployment insurance fund, public
and private sector joint projects, and the central budget); Turkish Premier
Encourages Dutch Investors, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 28, 2007,
(discussing a meeting of the Turkish Prime Minister and the Dutch, along with
Queen Beatrix of Netherlands, in which the Netherlands expressed a desire to
double the number of Dutch businessmen in Turkey).
87. Alexei Barrionuevo, Emerging Markets Find They Aren’t Insulated From
the Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Oct./ 7, 2008, at B1.
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VI. AVERTING A CRISIS
Although the GAP project in Turkey is behind schedule, the
downstream impact is already apparent. In Iraq the decline in water
quality and quantity is complicating the already difficult program of
reconstruction. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was
uninterested in planning and coordinating water issues with Syria
and Turkey. Water infrastructure in Iraq went into a steady and
catastrophic state of decline. The “joint technical committee” on
water resources between Turkey, Syria and Iraq did not meet
between 1993 and 1997. In 2004, Turkey provided a limited amount
of water flow data to the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources,
indicating that confidence-building measures are possible.88 This was
significant because the parties have long treated flow data as a
national security secret.
Even more important than water quantity is the question of water
quality. As more land is brought into production in Turkey, the
agricultural return flow will surely reduce the quality of water
received by the country’s neighbors to the south. The question of
water quality in the basin is not well documented or understood, in
part because the parties are generally unwilling to make data
available to outside review.
Will there be a water war in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin in the next
ten to twenty years, when the GAP in Turkey significantly impacts
the natural flow of the rivers? Rather than a classic shooting war, we
are more likely to see tensions, exacerbated relations, human
suffering and localized violence. With additional demands being
made on the rivers by uncooperative parties, water quantity and
quality will be a central cause of regional instability, leading to a
decline in economic and public health conditions. This decline will
in turn make the region’s peoples more susceptible to
fundamentalism and extremism, thereby undermining recent security
gains.

88. Interview with Waleed Abdel Hammad, Water Ministry of Iraq in
Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 1, 2004); see also CPA Press Release, supra note 58
(providing that Turkey and the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources established a
weekly exchange of information with important water flow data that has helped the
Ministry gain sovereignty).
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In his article “WaterWorld,” Robert Kaplan looks at the potential
consequences of climate change and rising sea levels in
Bangladesh.89 He describes how the explosive mix of environmental
degradation, human misery, and religious extremism is at work to
destabilize the government. Water shortages can provoke the same
results, as people find it more difficult to live their daily lives. This
can in turn cause the people to turn to extremism and violence as
their only recourse against an unresponsive government. In 2008
there were disturbing signs of instability based on regional food
shortages; this could be a prelude to a greater threat when water
supplies and water quality decline.90
What, if anything, can be done to avoid these consequences?
There may now be an historic opportunity for the creation of an
effective transboundary water initiative for Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
Despite the current turmoil in Iraq, the parties have demonstrated the
ability to meet and discuss confidence-building measures that could
lay the groundwork for further cooperation. In January 2008, there
were some promising signs that representatives of Turkey, Syria and
Iraq were meeting to discuss issues of common interest in the water
sector.91
A number of working models can provide a basis for regional
cooperation. The International Joint Commission92 addresses U.S.Canadian water issues and the Mekong River Commission93
89. Robert D. Kaplan, Waterworld, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 60.
90. Andrew Martin, Mideast Facing Difficult Choice, Crops or Water, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2008 at A1 (quoting Alan R. Richards, a professor of economics
and environmental studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz: “The
countries of the region are caught between the hammer of rising food prices and
the anvil of steadily declining water availability per capita”).
91. Ercan Yavuz, Turkey, Iraq, Syria to Initiate Water Talks, TODAY’S ZAMAN,
Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?
load=detay&link=136183 (reporting recent meetings of water officials in
Damascus and Istanbul, as well as a meeting of the Joint Technical Committee that
had not met since 1993 on the Iraq Ministry of Water Resources web site in March
2008).
92. See International Joint Commission, http://www.ijc.org/en/home/
main_accueil.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) (illustrating that the International
Joint Commission is an independent body for resolving disputes between the
United States and Canada over the two countries’ transboundary waters).
93. See The Mekong River Commission, http://www.mrcmekong.org/ (last
visited Aug. 19, 2008) (explaining that the commission’s role is to implement the
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coordinates water management efforts in Southeast Asia. Further,
with international support, the parties should benefit from a
diplomatic initiative similar to the one making progress in the Nile
Basin.94 The European Union and the World Bank can be principal
agents, making it a truly international endeavor. Turkey will
certianly resist the creation of an agency with anything that
approaches regulatory powers, but an “initiative” that respects
sovereignty could have some hope for success.
Over the past five years U.S. diplomacy has played a minor role
with respect to water issues in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin.95 During
the period of U.S. occupation of Iraq there was little or no movement
on the subject, other than the direct assistance to the Ministry of
Water Resources previously mentioned. And since the Iraqis have
regained sovereignty they have been generally too weak and divided
to assert a clear foreign policy on any subject. But the US
presidential elections in November 2008 could provide a catalyst for
change. The Obama administration will hopefully enter the region
with a renewed sense of purpose, and this could encourage
movement and cooperation in the Basin. There should be a
recognition in the United States that some well crafted diplomacy
could help retain stability during a time of transition in Iraq, and
promote long term benefits in the water sector.
We should not ignore a number of important programs that are
already helping to encourage progress and confidence building
measures in the Basin. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has
developed a number of initiatives, including a basin-wide modeling

Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong
River Basin as agreed upon by Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam).
94. See Nile Basin Initiative, NBI Background, http://www.nilebasin.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=42 (last visited Sept.
27, 2008) (describing the committee as a partnership developed by the countries of
the Nile River and aimed at cooperative development of the Nile).
95. In 2007, I inquired of a U.S. diplomat as to whether the United States had a
policy to help build cooperation concerning water in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin.
The answer revealed the state of affairs; “It depends on what you mean by policy.”
Interview with anonymous U.S. diplomat (2007).
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system, at the Hydrologic Engineering Center at Davis, California.96
Obtaining accurate data, and sharing it with all the Basin countries,
should help to promote cooperation. Technical assistance of this
kind, including the training of Iraqi water professionals, can go a
long way in enabling Iraq to deal effectively with domestic and
international water issues.

CONCLUSION
Declining water supplies, food shortages and financial problems
have recently combined to threaten stability in many parts of the
globe. But other events could help provide a window of opportunity
in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin on water issues. Action should be
taken now to encourage, with financial backing, the formation of an
international commission or other initiative for Turkey, Syria and
Iraq. The United States should take a greater role in sustaining such
an initiative and promoting basic confidence building measures.
With the right support, the people of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin can
begin to move towards cooperation rather than conflict with regard to
their water resources. And this will ultimately help to preserve the
fragile gains in Iraq that are so essential to regional stability.
Obtaining accurate data, and sharing it with all the Basin countries,
should help to promote cooperation. Technical assistance of this
kind, including the training of Iraqi water professionals, can go a
long way in enabling Iraq to deal effectively with domestic and
international water issues. The World Bank is now supporting the
work of an Arab Water Academy in Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, that will be the regions first water educational institution.97

96. See Nani Gould & Fauwaz Hanbali, Army Engineers Develop Model to
Support Iraqi Water Management, ENGINEER, Oct.-Dec. 2004, at 11, available at
http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/PDFs%20for%20Oct-Dec%2004/Gould-Han
bali.pdf
97. See The World Bank, Workshop Launches Arab Water Academy, available
at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/WBI
WATER/0,,contentMDK:21823813~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSiteP
K:443986,00.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).

